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I. INTRODUCTION
A year can be a long time in politics. One year ago, at the First Annual
Climate and Energy Law Symposium here at the University of San
Diego, there was good reason to believe that, at long last, the nation was
about to enact significant climate change legislation. The United States
Supreme Court had two years earlier set the table for a new Administration
* Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Professor of Law, Georgetown University, and
Stanley Legro Visiting Professor of Law, University of San Diego (2009–2010). This
essay is based on a presentation at the Second Annual Climate and Energy Law
Symposium—Next Generation Regulation: Instrument Choice in Climate Law—held at
the University of San Diego School of Law on April 9, 2010. Much of the content of this
essay borrows from a lengthier treatment of the topic first published in the Cornell Law
Review, in 2009. See Richard J. Lazarus Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change:
Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153 (2009).
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and a new Congress, by requiring in Massachusetts v. EPA, that the
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) reconsider its prior decision
of choosing not to determine whether greenhouse gas emissions from
new motor vehicles endanger public health or welfare.1 The new President,
Barack Obama, appointed individuals strongly supportive of sweeping
and comprehensive climate change legislation to important leadership
positions throughout the executive branch, including White House Climate
Change and Energy Advisor Carol Browner, EPA Administrator Lisa
Jackson, Council on Environmental Quality Chair Nancy Sutley, Secretary
of Energy Lawrence Chu, and Presidential Science Advisor John Holdren.
Congress seemed no less favorably inclined. The relevant leadership
positions in both chambers, from the Senate Majority Leader and Speaker
of the House to the Chairs of the most important authorization committees,
seemed disproportionately dominated by allies of climate change
legislation, with a heavy dose of California: Majority Leader Harry Reid,
Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Senate Committee on the Environment and Public
Works Chair Barbara Boxer, and House Commerce Committee Chair
Henry Waxman.
Yet only a year later, political pundits of every stripe are writing
climate change legislation’s obituary.2 Both sides of the debate are
treating as politically dead the legislation that the House passed in June
20093 and the bill that the Senate Democratic leadership introduced with
great fanfare in the fall of 2009.4 The only climate change legislation
that currently enjoys significant bi-partisan support, moreover, seeks to
prevent rather than impose greenhouse gas emission controls, by preventing
EPA from implementing new rules intended to provide for such controls
based on the existing Clean Air Act.5
1. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
2. John M. Broder, Climate Change Bill Is in Doubt, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2010,
available at http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/20/climate-change-bill-is-indoubt/; Katie Connolly, Why Climate Change Is Dead in the Senate, NEWSWEEK, Feb.
25, 2010, available at http://www.newsweek.com/id/234137; Editorial, Backing Down
on Climate Change, Feb. 5, 2010, L.A. TIMES, available at http://articles.latimes.com/
2010/feb/05/opinion/la-ed-climate5-2010feb05; Juliet Eilperin, Cap-and-Trade Declared
Dead—Again, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 2010, available at http://views.washingtonpost.com/
climate-change/post-carbon/2010/03/cap-and-trade_declared_dead—again.html; Juliet
Eilperin & Steven Mufson, Senators to Propose Abandoning Cap-and-trade, WASH. POST,
Feb. 27, 2010, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/
26/AR2010022606084.html.
3. H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009) (passed by 1st Sess. of the House on June 26,
2009).
4. Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, S. 1733, 111th Cong. (2009)
(introduced Sept. 30, 2009); Senate Rep. No. 111-121, Clean Energy Jobs and American
Power Act, 111th Cong. (2nd Sess. 2010).
5. S.J. Res. 26, 111th Cong., 2nd Sess. (introduced Jan. 21, 2010) (disapproving a
rule submitted by EPA relating to the endangerment finding and the cause or contribute
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How did this happen? A few too many snowflakes in the nation’s
capital in February 2010?6 A handful of misguided emails from scientists
who should have kept to their science and left politics to politicians?7 A
tea party in Massachusetts that placed a truck-driving Republican in Ted
Kennedy’s Senate seat in Massachusetts?8 Or a Senate procedural rule
from an earlier political era that, when applied in modern times,
effectively bars the passage of any new significant legislation?9
findings for greenhouse gases under section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act) (sponsors
include Senators Murkowski, Chambliss, Landrieu, Thune, Hutchison, Graham, Coburn,
Vitter, Cornyn, Isakson, Grassley, Alexander, Bond, Inhofe, Bunning, Carper, Brownback,
Roberts, McConnell, Enzi, McCain, Wicker, Lugar, Corker, Cochran, Kyl, Bennett,
Risch, Johanns, Sessions, Voinovich, Burr, Shelby, Gregg, Hatch, and LeMieux).
6. Christine Todd Whitman et al., Did D.C.’s Blizzard Bury Climate Change
Legislation? (“The recent bout of wintry weather and the overall political climate have
almost certainly killed climate-change legislation this year.”), WASH. POST, Feb. 14,
2010, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/12/
R2010021203910.html; Alexander Bolton, Climate-Change Legislation Buried Under
Record Snowfall in Capital, THE HILL, Feb. 9, 2010, available at http://thehill.com/home
news/senate/80485-climate-bill-buried-under-record-snowfall (“Sen. Jim DeMint . . .
used the D.C. snowstorm to make a political jab . . . . It’s going to keep snowing in DC
until Al Gore cries ̀ ̀’uncle.’”). John M. Broder, Climate-Change Debate Is Heating up in
Deep Freeze, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/
02/11/science/earth/11climate.html.
7. Andrew C. Revkin, Hacked E-Mail Is New Fodder for Climate Dispute, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 20, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/21/science/earth/
21climate.html; Juliet Eilperin & David A. Fahrenthold, Series of Missteps by Climate
Scientists Threatens Climate-Change Agenda, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 2010, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/14/AR2010021404283.html.
8. Darren Samuelsohn, Sen.-Elect Brown’s Win Adds More Question Marks to
Senate Climate Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/cwire/2010/01/20/20climatewire-sen-elect-browns-win-adds-more-question-mark48190.html; Evan Lehmann, Sen.-Elect Brown Is a ‘Blank Slate’ on Climate, Drawing
Concern and Optimism, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/cwire/2010/01/21/21climatewire-sen-elect-brown-is-a-blank-slate-on-climate-41366.
html; William O’Keefe, Planet Panel: Legislation Will Likely Be Delayed, WASH. POST,
Feb. 15, 2010, available at http://views.washingtonpost.com/climate-change/panelists/
william_okeefe/2010/01/legislation_will_likely_be_delayed.html (“[Due to Scott Brown’s
election], climate legislation has been put off for at least the rest of this year.”).
9. Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REV. 181,
181 (1997) (“The filibuster in the United States Senate imposes an effective supermajority
requirement for the enactment of most legislation.”); Norman Ornstein, Our Broken
Senate, THE AMERICAN, March/April 2008, available at http://www.american.com/archive/
2008/march-april-magazine-contents/our-broken-senate (“Filibusters . . . simply [don’t]
provide any hope of regular 51-vote majorities.”); Thomas Geoghegan, Op-ed, Mr. Smith
Rewrites the Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2010/01/11/opinion/11geoghegan.html (“[T]he Senate, as it now operates, really
has become unconstitutional: . . . a 60-vote majority is required to overcome a filibuster
and pass any contested bill.”).
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The blueprint for construction of the political wall now seemingly
blocking climate change legislation in Washington no doubt includes a
mix of each of the above features, with the Senate procedural rules
serving as the most portentous deal-breaker. But there is a more sobering
political lesson to be drawn from the remarkable reversal of political
fortunes. Climate change’s gloomy political fate right now is not the
product of mere meteorological bad luck or political missteps. What is
telling is that it could take seemingly so little to change so much so quickly.
And, that unfortunately, is the truly bad news for those concerned about
climate change.
The reason that it took so little to shift political fortunes so
significantly is that many people, businesses, and political leaders would
prefer to be climate skeptics, no matter how overwhelming the scientific
evidence to the contrary. That is why they will readily embrace almost
any available excuse—even some extra snowflakes—to ignore the
problem. Justice Antonin Scalia, during the oral argument in Massachusetts
v. EPA, expressed what is probably the unstated feeling of many
Americans when, acknowledging that he was “not a scientist,” he added
that “[t]hat’s why I don’t want to have to deal with global warming, to
tell you the truth.”10
Justice Scalia is, of course, right. No one wants to have to “deal with
global warming,” for understandable reasons. The politics of climate
change are several orders of magnitude more difficult than the science of
climate change. It is no less than a lawmaking nightmare.11 National
healthcare legislation is mere child’s play compared to climate change.
The challenge for climate change is no less than to persuade the world’s
most powerful nations and industries to dramatically curtail the
greenhouse gas emissions upon which their current economies and high
standards of living are premised. And they must do so although the
costs of such curtailment will be immediate and potentially huge,
compared to benefits realized not only in distant times and places but
also only if not eliminated altogether by increased emissions from
developing nations beyond the reach of any international lawmaking
authority. Presented with such a nightmarish political scenario that
seemingly offers little hope for a lawmaking answer, it should not be
surprising that many people are quick to conclude that climate change is
in fact no more than a bad dream, which they can readily avoid by

10. Transcript of Oral Argument at 23, Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497
(2007) (No. 05-1120).
11. See Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change, supra note *, at
1184–87.
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waking up. Choosing between hope and hopelessness, they naturally
choose hope.
Climate scientists and environmentalists would be delighted to be
wrong about climate change. But there is little beyond wishful thinking
to believe that their concerns are misdirected. The basic scientific
foundation of the existing scientific consensus regarding the significant
threats posed by climate change and humankind’s contributions to it
remains largely intact. The need for climate legislation is no less pressing
today than it was a year ago. Indeed, given the inherent costs of delay—
because the more emissions rise the more costly it is to reduce them in
the future12—the case for climate legislation is even more compelling
than it was one year ago.
Fortunately, with a nod to Mark Twain, my own view is that “reports
of [climate change’s] death are greatly exaggerated.” This is not the first
time environmental law’s obituary has been written.13 In the early 1970s,
many considered environmental law a flash-in-the-pan fad, especially
after the oil embargo during the middle of that decade. And, few thought
environmental regulations could survive intact after they were targeted
for major reformation by an enormously popular President, Ronald Reagan,
during the 1980s. Yet, on each of those prior occasions, environmental
law has not only revived to meet the next set of daunting challenges but
in fact rebounded with increased vigor.14 That is why I fully expect that,
buoyed by a new wave of scientific reports and the backing of the White
House, climate change’s lawmaking moment will, Lazarus-like, soon be
resurrected.
As I have written elsewhere at greater length,15 the inherent problem
with such lawmaking moments is just that—they are moments. What
Congress and the President do with much fanfare can quickly and quietly
slip away in the ensuing years. This is famously so in environmental law.
Subsequent legislative amendments, limited budgets, appropriations
riders, interpretive agency rulings, massive delays in rule-making, and
simple nonenforcement are more than capable of converting a seemingly
uncompromising legal mandate into nothing more than a symbolic

12. Id. at 1164–68.
13. See RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW xi–xii (Univ.
of Chicago Press, 2004).
14. Id. at xi–xiii.
15. The subsequent discussion in this essay excerpts from that prior article. For a
more in-depth treatment of the themes discussed herein, see Lazarus, supra note *.
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aspirational statement. In short, what Congress and the President give,
they can just as easily take away. The same powerful short-term impulses
that seek to prevent a law’s enactment in the first instance do not disappear
upon the law’s passage. They instead typically remain to seek the law’s
ultimate undoing over time.
The critical lesson for climate change legislation is that the pending
lawmaking moment must include the enactment of provisions specifically
designed to maintain the legislation’s ability to achieve its long-term
objectives over the longer term. For climate change legislation to be
successful, the new legal framework must simultaneously be flexible in
certain respects and steadfast in others. Flexibility is necessary to allow
for the modification of legal requirements over time in light of new
information. Steadfastness or “stickiness” is important to maintain the
stability of a law’s requirements over time. The need for both is particularly
great for climate change legislation. Flexibility is absolutely essential
for climate change legislation in light of the enormity of the undertaking,
both in its temporal and spatial reach, and the surrounding uncertainty
concerning the wisdom of specific regulatory approaches. Yet the basic
legal framework and legal mandate must also be steadfast enough to be
maintained over the long term notwithstanding what will be an unrelenting
barrage of extremely powerful short-term economic interests that will
inevitably seek the mandate’s relaxation.
To that end, the law will need to include institutional design features
that allow for such flexibility but insulate programmatic implementation
to a significant extent from powerful political and economic interests
propelled by short-term concerns. Such design features will include
“precommitment strategies,”16 which deliberately make it hard (but
never impossible) to change the law in response to some kinds of concerns.
At the same time, the legislation should also include contrasting
precommitment strategies that deliberately make it easier to change the
law in response to other longer-term concerns that are in harmony with
the law’s central purpose, which is to achieve and maintain greenhouse
gas emissions reductions over time. Such concerns are otherwise less
likely to have powerful voices in lawmaking fora. Directed to all three
branches of government, such institutional design features should
therefore be deliberately asymmetric, making it easier to change the law
in one substantive direction rather than another.
16. Id. at 1158; see also id. at 1205–31 (discussing the ways precommitment
strategies might be used to affect the actions of the legislative and executive branches);
see generally Samuel Freeman, Reason and Agreement in Social Contract Views, 19
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 122, 143 (1990) (defining “joint commitment”); Thomas C. Schelling,
Enforcing Rules on Oneself, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 357, 363–64 (1985) (giving examples
of rules set in the present for the purpose of affecting future behaviors).
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The obvious objection to any such deliberate modifications of lawmaking
processes, especially those that make future lawmaking more difficult, is
that they are antidemocratic. These modifications allow the views of
existing majorities to trump the views of future majorities who may well
view sound public policy very differently. The shorthand reference to
this objection, of course, is that the dead hand of the past or present
should not be able to govern the future.17
There are, however, at least three compelling reasons why the dead
hand concern is not persuasive as applied to the need for substantial
lawmaking restraints in federal climate change legislation. The first is
that such restraints, notwithstanding their seemingly antidemocratic
implications, have a long and widely accepted history in domestic law,
ranging from the Constitution’s organization of the House and the Senate
to a host of existing federal statutes that seek to insulate somewhat uncertain
decisions from politics. Hence, such restraints, rather than suggest a
departure from the nation’s lawmaking traditions, at the very least fall
well within them. Second, the lawmaking restraints in federal climate
change legislation would be deliberately asymmetric in order to further
the options available to future generations, not restrict them. Skewing
currently exists in lawmaking in general and certain interest groups exercise
undue influence at the expense of others. The institutional lawmaking
design features contemplated for federal climate legislation would be
designed to redress that existing skewing and therefore ultimately foster
and not undermine the fundamental values underlying representative
government.18
The final justification relates to the sheer impracticalities of failing to
address over the longer term the threats now posed by climate change.
Preserving the ability of future majorities to retain the full range of
options necessary for self-government most likely depends on climate
change legislation being capable of maintaining greenhouse gas emissions
reductions over the longer term. Otherwise, current lawmakers will
undercut the autonomy of future majorities by subjecting them to a
natural environment that sharply curtails their options. In other words,
cross-temporal majority effects will occur with or without climate change
legislation. The question is not whether to have such cross-temporal

17.
1194.
18.

See Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change, supra note *, at
Id. at 1194–95.
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impacts, but which ones to have. To the extent, therefore, that lawmaking
restraints are a necessary component of climate change legislation that
can provide future majorities with greater opportunities, they further
rather than undermine democratic norms.19
The section below describes some preliminary ideas, many of which
are traceable to strategies that Congress has previously embraced in
other contexts. Some are directed to congressional lawmaking. Others
are aimed at Executive Branch implementation.20
A. Congress
One option is to design federal climate legislation in a manner that
would create a powerful political constituency with a strong economic
incentive favoring the legislation’s preservation. Such provisions should
not be difficult to create. For instance, a tradable emissions program
would be expected to generate billions of dollars in revenue from the
sale of emissions rights.21 Those revenues could be allocated to address
climate change concerns, ranging from efforts to develop more efficient
technologies capable of reducing greenhouse gas emissions to assistance
to persons and places likely to suffer from both the climate change no
longer avoidable and dislocations caused by a shift to an economy that
produces lower emissions. Recipients of those funds would have a strong
incentive to resist legislative amendments that threaten the continued
availability of such financial support.
A different tack is to limit more directly the lawmaking avenue most
susceptible to use by powerful, narrowly focused interests seeking to
gain short-term economic advantage: the appropriations process. To the
great detriment of environmental law, it is the appropriations process
that has most lent itself to such efforts by riddling environmental law
with appropriations riders and earmarks.22 One possible anticipatory
response is to include procedural hurdles or canons of statutory
construction targeted directly to laws enacted exclusively through the
appropriations process. The justification would be the shared understanding
that the appropriations process does not lend itself to the careful
deliberations generally warranted for major changes in substantive law.

19. Id. at 1195.
20. For a full description of these options, see id. at 1205–31.
21. See Peter Crampton & Suzi Kerr, Tradeable Carbon Permit Auctions: How
and Why to Auction Not Grandfather, 30 ENERGY POL’Y 333, 334 (2002) (suggesting
that a tradeable emissions permit auction could generate $125 billion per year).
22. See Richard J. Lazarus, Congressional Descent: The Demise of Deliberative
Democracy in Environmental Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 619, 638–52 (2006).
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A far bolder move, however, is to insulate parts of the greenhouse gas
emissions reduction and climate change adaptation programs from the
appropriations process altogether. What Congress did with the Federal
Reserve Board provides the legislative precedent. Congress allowed the
Federal Reserve Board to retain revenue it generated in its operations in
order to shield the Board from the politics of the congressional
appropriations process.23 The same could be done in the context of climate
change. Implementation of federal climate change legislation will,
assuming a tradable emissions program, generate billions of dollars in
revenue.24 Some of that revenue could be used to insulate the especially
vulnerable aspects of the greenhouse gas regulation program from the
appropriations process and therefore the short-term economic interests
that tend to dominate that particular lawmaking avenue.
B. Executive Branch Lawmaking
There are many ways to design climate change legislation in anticipation
of problems that may arise in the Executive Branch’s administration of
the law. Some measures could be designed to insulate agency officials
to some extent from political pressures, especially those pressures likely
to derive from short-term economic concerns, which undermine the
law’s effectiveness. Other measures could be crafted to enhance the
influence of interest groups that are concerned about protecting future
generations but which otherwise lack the necessary economic or political
clout. Some of the possibilities worthy of consideration are catalogued
and described below.
1.

Insulating (Somewhat) Agency Officials from Politics

A variety of measures could be used to try to insulate agency officials
from the short-term political pressures that could undermine a climate
change statute’s effective, fair, and impartial administration. None
purports to achieve complete insulation, nor should they. Political
influence is neither all bad nor all inappropriate. Quite often, some
political accountability is necessary for a law’s legitimacy. The purpose

23. See Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change, supra note *, at
1203–04.
24. See supra note 21.
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of such insulating measures is to temper, not eliminate, the influence of
politics on statutory implementation.
For instance, federal climate change legislation could define in some
detail the substantive qualifications, tenures, and grounds for removal or
disqualification of specific agency officials charged with particularly
important and sensitive statutory responsibilities. There is no reason for
Congress to delegate complete discretion on such potentially important
matters to the President, cabinet secretary, agency head, or other agency
officials.25
2.

Structuring the Implementation Process to Diminish the Influence
of Short-Term Interests Likely to be Unduly Influential and to
Promote Consideration of Longer-Term Interests Otherwise
Unlikely to Receive Their Due Weight

A second category of institutional design features pertains to techniques
for ensuring that certain kinds of factors are given due consideration and
that others are not given undue weight during the Executive Branch’s
implementation of climate change legislation. These techniques can be
used to promote accountability, deliberativeness, impartiality, and
transparency in general. Alternatively, they can be shaped to ensure that
specific factors that are anticipated to be undervalued instead receive
their due. Several possibilities are described below.
•
•

Requirements for interagency consultation to promote a fuller
consideration of relevant factors and therefore reduce the prospects
of a narrow, short-term interest hijacking a law’s implementation.26
Creation of a new expert governmental entity to ensure that
certain interests are given due weight during agency implementation
of climate change legislation.

25. See Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change, supra note *, at
1212–16.
26. Interagency consultation requirements are a regular feature of environmental
statutes. For instance, the Endangered Species Act (ESA) requires that federal agencies
subject to section 7 of the Act consult with the Secretary of the Interior (for terrestrial
wildlife or plants) or the Secretary of Commerce (for marine life) if they believe that an
endangered or threatened species may be adversely affected by a contemplated agency
action. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1) (2006). Another example of an existing, effective
interagency consultation requirement is section 309 of the Clean Air Act, which requires
federal agencies preparing environmental impact statements pursuant to the National
Environmental Policy Act to provide the EPA with an opportunity to review their draft
impact statements. See 42 U.S.C. § 7609 (2006) (“The Administrator shall review and
comment in writing on the environmental impact of any matter relating to duties and
responsibilities granted pursuant to this chapter or other provisions of the authority of the
Administrator . . . .”).
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•

•

3.

Provisions for consideration of more neutral, objective scientific
expertise during statutory implementation to diminish the influence
of politically powerful short-term economic interests and promote
consideration of longer-term consequences if supported by
scientific evidence.
Participatory rights for selected stakeholders in the implementation
stages to ensure that important but less politically powerful
voices are heard during statutory implementation.27
Maintaining and, if Necessary, Accelerating the Executive Branch’s
Implementation of Climate Change Legislation

A third category of design features will anticipate the many roadblocks
that will occur during the process of statutory implementation within the
Executive Branch, especially over the long term. Such features would
deliberately build into the original statutory scheme mechanisms that
directly limit the effectiveness of the roadblock. These features could
accomplish that end in different ways: sometimes by creating lawmaking
shortcuts that circumvent the roadblock and other times simply by
eliminating the roadblock altogether. The statutory objective in either
circumstance would be the same: to prevent the Executive Branch, either
intentionally or negligently, from frustrating congressional objectives by
delaying the law’s implementation.
a. For instance, Congress can create a lawmaking shortcut that allows
lawmaking to be made in the absence of Executive Branch action within
a specified time period. This can occur if Congress would actually
prefer Executive Branch lawmaking but anticipates that roadblocks may
prevent the agency from acting in a sufficiently expeditious manner.
Both to encourage the agency to act, and to ensure that law is made
without undue delay, Congress can create a lawmaking scheme that is
triggered by default in the event that the agency fails to act by the
statutorily specified deadline.28 Drafters of climate change legislation
27. See Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change, supra note *, at
1216–25.
28. Congress embraced such a design feature in the Hazardous and Solid Waste
Act Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221, by adding what have been
euphemistically referred to as “soft” and “hard” “hammers” that call for automatic imposition
of extraordinarily harsh pretreatment standards in the event that the EPA misses the
statutorily prescribed deadlines for promulgation of pretreatment standards. See 42
U.S.C. § 6904. Congress’s establishment of a default standard completely changed the
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might well want to consider including such lawmaking shortcuts that
precommit to certain climate change emissions reduction requirements
in the absence of the necessary subsequent action taken by the Executive
Branch agency charged with the law’s implementation. The potential is
considerable that those resisting imposition of climate change emissions
reduction requirements will seek to delay their implementation. But by
anticipating that potential and precommiting to certain legal standards in
the event of delays greater than a specified time period, climate change
legislation can effectively both reduce the incentive for such obstructionist
efforts and ensure that a lengthy legal vacuum does not result.29
b. Congress could also create a lawmaking shortcut by separating the
policy question of what standard should apply in a particular factual
circumstance from the distinct factual inquiry of whether that
circumstance is actually present. A statutorily prescribed standard triggered
by a subsequent agency finding allows Congress to dictate what the
regulatory requirements or other regulatory measures must be to address
different degrees of environmental hazards but then leave to another
entity the responsibility (and potential political heat) of making the
finding that triggers the standard. Congress, in effect, precommits to a
series of lawmaking standards that someone else then triggers.30 Congress
therefore is not itself immediately responsible for making the hard
political choice.
Climate change legislation could also utilize this kind of precommitment
device. Congress could precommit to increasingly stringent standards
depending, for instance, on the degree of greenhouse gas emissions
reductions deemed necessary. This precommitment would allow Congress
to make the critical policy determination regarding which kinds and
combinations of regulatory measures and economic incentives would be
best to achieve different levels of emissions reduction. But at the same
lawmaking dynamic. Not only did the EPA have an overriding incentive to meet the
deadlines, but regulated industry also had an incentive to ensure the agency’s compliance.
See James J. Florio, Congress as Reluctant Regulator: Hazardous Waste Policy in the
1980’s, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 351, 351 (1986) (noting that Congress “established selfenforcing standards to be implemented in the absence of agency action”); Michael P.
Vandenbergh, An Alternative to Ready, Fire, Aim: A New Framework to Link Environmental
Targets in Environmental Law, 85 KY. L.J. 803, 839 (1997).
29. See Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change, supra note *, at
1225–26.
30. The nonattainment provisions of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990
illustrate this possibility. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7501–15. Here again, Congress sought to take
away the EPA’s discretion to decide what regulatory measures were necessary to address
varying degrees of nonattainment of national ambient air quality standards. Accordingly,
Congress set forth in exhaustive detail programs that became increasingly prescriptive
for sources of air pollution as an area of the country went from just barely out of
compliance to extremely out of compliance. See id. §§ 7511–12.
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time, Congress could leave to a more detached, politically insulated body
the decision regarding how serious the climate change problem truly
was, how much temperature could rise, and therefore how much reduction
of emissions was in fact necessary.31
c. A statutory provision for non-, limited-, or conditional federal
preemption of state climate change law could be another effective
technique for ensuring that federal climate change legislation stays on
track over the long term. The extent to which federal law preempts state
climate change law is likely to be one of the most significant policy
disputes in the drafting of the federal legislation during the next four
years.32 Industry generally supports federal preemption of state climate
law, while states and many environmental organizations oppose it,
especially in light of what they perceive as decades of foot-dragging on
the issue by the national government.33 Congress could draft a federal
preemption provision that both strikes a balance between these competing
concerns and serves as a very significant check on the federal government’s
implementation of climate change legislation.
For instance, the federal statute could make the ultimate scope of
federal preemption expressly dependent on the success of federal efforts.
Congress could use any number of benchmarks to measure success or
lack of success. The statutory trigger required for preemption, limited
preemption, or nonpreemption could be a formal finding or action by a
designated federal government official, a designated committee of
individuals within or outside the government with relevant expertise, or
even the states themselves. Congress could consider just the fact of action
by a large number of states to be sufficient evidence that there was
something remiss in the federal effort. The lifting of federal preemption,
or the mere threat of a lifting of federal preemption, might well be

31. See Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change, supra note *, at
1226–28.
32. See Daniel A. Farber, Climate Change, Federalism, and the Constitution, 50
ARIZ. L. REV. 879, 900–10, 921–23 (2008) (discussing preemption in the context of
climate change law).
33. See Lisa Heinzerling, Climate, Preemption, and the Executive Branches, 50
ARIZ. L. REV. 925, 925–29 (2008) (suggesting that “state regulation of greenhouse
gases . . . would benefit from equal attention to the role of state executive agencies in
asserting power to regulate even in the face of federal resistance”); Felicity Barringer &
William Yardley, Bush Splits on Greenhouse Gases with Congress and State Officials,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2007, at A1.
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enough to provide federal officials and industry with the incentives
necessary to jumpstart a stalled federal program.34
d. Finally, lawmaking design features could even seek to remove
altogether anticipated litigation roadblocks to statutory implementation
by limiting judicial review of some kinds of agency decisions and
promoting judicial review of other kinds of agency decisions.35 Congress
could define these limits by focusing on types of decisions or types of
plaintiffs in determining which kinds of lawsuits threaten timely
implementation and which kinds of lawsuits are, by contrast, necessary
to spur timely implementation. For instance, under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, Congress
limited judicial review of administrative agency orders and remedies to
clean up hazardous waste sites in order to prevent lawsuits from slowing
the cleanup process.36 There may well be aspects of the implementation
of climate change legislation that are at least as urgent and for which
Congress may want to ensure implementation is not delayed as a result
of lawsuits brought by certain kinds of aggrieved plaintiffs.
Conversely, Congress may decide that judicial review is precisely
what is necessary to eliminate statutory roadblocks, including agency
enforcement, that Congress anticipates will arise within the Executive
Branch. To that end, Congress can authorize certain kinds of plaintiffs
with certain kinds of claims to bring citizen suits seeking court orders
that the agency comply with statutory mandates or judicial relief against
a source of greenhouse gas emissions in violation of federal requirements.
The Supreme Court has previously ruled that Congress can by statute
create injuries, define causal chains, and provide for legal redress in a
manner that allows for a citizen suit that would otherwise fall short of
Article III.37

34. See Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change, supra note *, at
1228–29.
35. See id. at 1229–31.
36. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h).
37. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 516 (2007) (“‘Congress has the power to
define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or
controversy where none existed before.’”) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 580 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment));
Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 128 S. Ct. 1142, 1153 (2009) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(“This case would present different considerations if Congress had sought to provide
redress for a concrete injury ‘giv[ing] rise to a case or controversy where none existed
before.’”) (quoting same).
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II. CONCLUSION
One year in politics can be a long time. During the spring of 2009,
many assumed Congress would pass significant climate legislation within
two years, and perhaps even in time for the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change 15th Conference of the Parties, to be
held later that same year in December at Copenhagen. By that winter,
however, the political winds seemed to be blowing in the precise opposite
direction and a no less certain consensus deemed federal climate legislation
moribund.
But a broader lesson of these dramatically shifting political winds
surrounding climate change is that lawmaking design is a critical feature
of climate change legislation. Even assuming that Congress will enact
meaningful climate change legislation in the next few years, the success
of those legislative efforts will turn on the federal government’s subsequent
ability to stay the statutory course over the longer term, measured not by
years but by multiple decades. Otherwise, significant reductions of
greenhouse gas emissions will not occur.
The associated lawmaking design challenge is considerable. One
must include within the legislative package lawmaking features capable
of withstanding the strong pressures generated by powerful short-term
interests seeking implementation delays and exceptions from the law’s
requirements. Yet, because the legislation must be maintained over the
longer term, there must also be some flexibility to allow for learning,
especially from those interests that are less likely to have the political
clout required to have their voices heard by those charged with the law’s
implementation. The resulting lawmaking design will, accordingly, have to
be deliberately asymmetrical in an effort to counter those asymmetries
that already dominate our political system and that threaten to unravel
the effectiveness of climate legislation once enacted.
The challenge to develop the right mix of precommitment strategies is
considerable, and the risk of any particular law being perversely hijacked
can never be eliminated. But through the kind of asymmetric hurdles
and shortcuts described above, Congress could at least diminish the risk
of short-term pressures undermining whatever legislation it passes and
increase the chance that the concerns of future generations would not be
forgotten during the decades required for the new law’s ambitious
objective to be achieved. Perhaps a year from now, Congress will have
taken some significant strides in that direction.
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